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Fighting for the Right to Housing in Canada 
 
TRACY HEFFERNAN, FAY FARADAY & PETER ROSENTHAL∗ 
 
 
“Lawyers going it alone is nonsensical.” 
 
Justice Zakeria Yacoob, 
Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa1 
 
Cet article se penche sur la décision Tanudjaja c Procureur général qui porte sur le 
« droit au logement ». Les auteurs, tous trois avocats ayant été impliqués dans l’affaire, 
traitent du contexte de celle-ci, de la nature de la demande et des questions juridiques 
relatives aux réclamations fondées sur les articles 7 et 15 de la Charte canadienne des 
droits et libertés. Ces questions comprennent les obligations positives en vertu de la 
Charte et du droit international, les procédures innovatrices adoptant une approche 
systémique et remettant en question des lois opprimantes, et les ordonnances de 
surveillance innovantes. Les auteurs examinent les implications procédurales et de fond, 
de la démarche des gouvernements provinciaux et fédéraux de faire une requête en 
radiation. Ils étudient les décisions de la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario et de la 
Cour d’appel de l’Ontario de radier la demande. Ils analysent l’impact de ces décisions 
pour les plaideurs futures en matière de Charte. Ils traitent également de la relation entre 
l’organisation communautaire et le droit d’ester en justice des communautés 
marginalisées. 
 
This paper examines Tanudjaja v Attorney General—the “Right to Housing” case. The 
authors, co-counsel on the case, discuss the context of the case, the nature of the 
application, and the legal underpinnings of the section 7 and 15 Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms claims, including positive obligations under the Charter and 
international law, innovative procedure taking a systemic approach to challenging 
oppressive legislation, and innovative supervisory orders. The authors examine the 
procedural and substantive implications of the provincial and federal governments’ move 
to strike the case, parse the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Ontario Court of 
Appeal decisions striking the application, and analyze the impact these decisions may 
have for future Charter litigants. They also address the relationship between community 
organizing and litigating rights of marginalized communities. 
                                                 
∗Tracy Heffernan is a community activist and lawyer at the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario. Fay Faraday is a 
Toronto lawyer with an independent social justice practice focused on constitutional, human rights, and labour 
law. She is also a Visiting Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, the Packer Visiting Chair in Social Justice at 
York University, and an Innovation Fellow at the Metcalf Foundation. Peter Rosenthal is Professor Emeritus of 
Mathematics and Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Toronto. His legal practice is primarily devoted to 
cases concerning social justice. 
 
1
 Zakeria Yacoob, former justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in a talk at the Wellesley Institute, 
Toronto, Canada, 15 February 2013. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
ADEQUATE HOUSING IS FUNDAMENTAL to ensuring physical and mental health, social 
inclusion, and participation in society. It safeguards the capacity to exercise and experience other 
fundamental rights. It is necessary for human life and essential to survival. 
So how is it that across Canada we have at minimum 235,000 people who are homeless 
and close to one in five who experience extreme housing affordability problems?2 A crisis in 
homelessness and affordable housing does not “just happen.” It is not a “normal” or “inevitable” 
part of modern society. Instead, the systemic mass homelessness that currently exists in Canada 
is a very recent phenomenon that emerged in the mid-1990s as a direct result of government 
funding cuts.3 It is a manufactured social problem that is the entirely predictable outcome of a 
series of active legislative and policy choices made by the federal and provincial governments.4 
Homelessness and inadequate housing continue to be produced and sustained by that interlocking 
system of laws and policies.  
Frustrated with the lack of action to rectify this social crisis, a group of individuals with 
lived experience of homelessness, community activists, academics, and lawyers in Ontario 
launched an innovative legal challenge in 2010. The Tanudjaja v Attorney General of Canada 
and Attorney General of Ontario challenge asserts that in taking the active decisions to 
implement these laws and policies that produce and perpetuate homelessness and inadequate 
housing, the federal and provincial governments have violated the constitutional rights of the 
most marginalized members of our communities.5 
The authors are co-counsel representing the applicants in the Right to Housing challenge. 
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the legal foundations for that claim. It analyzes the 
foundations for recognizing that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms imposes positive 
obligations on government to safeguard social and economic rights that are fundamental to 
human survival such as the right to housing. It provides an analysis of how Canada’s 
international human rights obligations to protect social and economic rights like the right to 
adequate housing inform government obligations under section 7 and section 15 of the Charter. 
The Right to Housing challenge presents an innovative approach to Charter litigation. It 
deliberately defines the nature of constitutional obligations and the scope of Charter rights from 
the perspective of those who are most marginalized. It also directly challenges the systemic roots 
of marginalization, aiming to hold government accountable for building an identifiable network 
of interconnected laws and policies that predictably facilitate and exacerbate oppression and 
                                                 
2
 Stephen Gaetz, Tanya Gulliver & Tim Richter, The State of Homelessness in Canada: 2014 (Toronto: The 
Homeless Hub Press, 2014), online: <http://www.homelesshub.ca/SOHC2014> [Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, State of 
Homelessness: 2014]. See Michael Shapcott’s “Precarious Housing Iceberg” chart at p 9 of his affidavit, Tanudjaja 
v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2011), ON SC File No. CV-10-403688,  
online: <http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-to-housing/application-material.html > [Shapcott, “Affidavit”]. 
3
 Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, State of Homelessness: 2014, supra note 2 at 4–5. 
4
 As Jack Layton wrote, “Homelessness is not some mysterious affliction visited upon us by unseen forces. It is the 
tragic, but inevitable, outcome of a series of policy decisions. And just as homelessness can be created, so too can it 
be ended.” Jack Layton, Homelessness: How to End the National Crisis (Revised and Updated) (Penguin Books: 
2008) at xxv [Layton, Homelessness]. 
5
 Tanudjaja et al v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2012), ON SC File No. CV-10-
403688. 
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marginalization. The systemic nature of the Right to Housing legal claim is both novel and 
central to its essence. It takes on what in the environmental context has been called the “slow 
violence” perpetrated by existing systems and institutions.6 As Rob Nixon writes,  
 
[w]e are accustomed to conceiving violence as immediate and explosive, erupting 
into instant, concentrated visibility. But we need to revisit our assumptions and 
consider the relative invisibility of slow violence. I mean a violence that is neither 
spectacular nor instantaneous but instead incremental … Emphasizing the temporal 
dispersion of slow violence can change the way we perceive and respond to a variety 
of social crises … .7 
 
The national crisis of homelessness has not erupted instantaneously as in the wake of a 
natural disaster. It is instead a socially constructed disaster that continues to accumulate 
inexorably. As Cathy Crowe has written, “[a] disaster is not just a single event but a social 
consequence.”8 What this means is that looking at a single law or policy change in isolation fails 
to reveal the depth of the impact on the rights claimants. Examining discrete state actions in 
isolation fragments the inherently interconnected consequences experienced by those who are 
homeless or at risk of homelessness and renders the unconstitutional effect of the state-driven 
system either invisible or only partially revealed. The claim is novel in that it consciously maps 
the system and the interrelated systemic effects. In this way, the Right to Housing challenge 
examines the breadth of state action that is necessary to sustain particular power relationships 
and presents a direct challenge to how we conceive of government accountability for the 
consequences of its policy choices. 
The governments’ response was to launch motions to strike the Charter claim in its 
entirety on the basis that it was not justiciable and that it raised no reasonable cause of action 
under either section 7 or section 15. The governments argued that the claim was not justiciable 
because it raised “political” rather than legal concerns and that the remedies sought (which 
included declarations of rights violations, injunctive relief and supervisory orders) were beyond 
the institutional competence of the court. The governments argued that neither section 7 nor 
section 15 of the Charter imposed any positive obligations on government, nor did they protect 
social and economic rights. 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the motions, striking the claim in its 
entirety without leave to amend. The motion judge ruled that the claim raised non-justiciable 
political questions, sought non-justiciable remedies, and raised no reasonable cause of action 
under either section 7 or section 15.9 On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal issued a divided 
ruling.10 The majority dismissed the claim on the basis that it raised non-justiciable political 
questions.11 In view of this analysis, the majority did not examine the scope of protection that 
                                                 
6
 See Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
7
 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence: Literary and Postcolonial Studies Have Ignored the Environmentalism that 
Often Only the Poor Can See, online: The Chronicle of Higher Education (26 June 2011) 
<http://chronicle.com/article/Slow-Violence/127968/>. 
8
 Cited in Layton, Homelessness, supra note 4 at “Foreword” xiii. 
9
 Tanudjaja v Attorney General (Canada) (Application), 2013 ONSC 5410, Lederer J [Tanudjaja 2013]. 
10
 Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852 [Tanudjaja ONCA]. 
11
 Ibid at para 19, Pardu JA. 
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may be afforded under either section 7 or section 15.12 In a strong dissent, Feldman JA would 
have allowed the appeal and allowed the claim to proceed on its merits because “the application 
raises significant issues of public importance.”13 Feldman JA ruled that the application raised 
justiciable legal claims, sought justiciable remedies, and that there was support in the 
jurisprudence for both the section 7 and section 15 claims. Characterizing the claim as a “serious 
Charter application” that raised issues that are basic to the life and well-being of a large, 
marginalized, vulnerable, and disadvantaged group, Feldman JA concluded that it was an error of 
law to strike the claim at the pleadings stage and that the evidentiary record supporting the claim 
should be put before the court.14 At the time of writing, the claimants are seeking leave to appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation on the motion to strike, the legal analysis 
supporting the claim warrants closer examination because it presents innovative strategies and 
analysis on both procedural and substantive elements of Charter litigation that can contribute to 
future thinking on how to ensure that Charter rights remain responsive and accessible to those 
who are most marginalized.  
 
II. FORMULATING THE CASE 
 
Across Canada at least 235,000 people are homeless annually and close to one in five experience 
extreme housing affordability problems.15 This has a significant impact on individuals, families, 
and communities: it takes a serious toll on physical and mental health, reduces life expectancy, 
and exacerbates mental health problems.16 In 2013 alone, the public expenditure on emergency 
responses to homelessness (emergency shelters, health services, social services, and correctional 
services) cost $7.05 billion.17 According to some research, providing adequate housing for all, 
including supports where needed, would cost about half this amount.18 
In the face of this, the question looms: how do we address this growing crisis of 
homelessness? Can the right to housing be realized in Canada? In 2008, four activists19 posed 
these questions at a workshop. Scheduled early on a Saturday morning, it was packed to capacity 
                                                 
12
 Ibid at para 37, Pardu JA. 
13
 Ibid at para 43, Feldman JA, dissenting. 
14
 Ibid at paras 43, 64, 68, 81, 86–88. Feldman JA dissenting. 
15
 Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, State of Homelessness: 2014, supra note 2 at 5; see e.g. Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra 
note 2 at 9. 
16
 Mental Health Commission of Canada, Paula Goering et al, National Final Report: Cross-Site At Home/Chez Soi 
Project (Calgary, AB: 2014) at 9 [Goering, National Final Report]. 
17
 Stephen Gaetz, et al, The State of Homelessness in Canada 2013 (Toronto: Canadian Homelessness Research 
Network Press, 2013), online: <http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC2103.pdf > .  
18
 See e.g. Stephen Gaetz, “The real cost of homelessness: Can we save money by doing the right thing?” (Toronto: 
Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press, 2012) at 2, online: 
<http://homelesshub.ca/ResourceFiles/costofhomelessness_paper21092012.pdf >. As Gaetz points out, it would cost 
far less to do the right thing, that is, to provide adequate housing [Gaetz, “Real Cost of Homelessness”]. See also 
Goering, National Finding Report, supra note 16 at 9.  The researchers found that for every $10 spent on providing 
adequate housing and supports, the government saved $15; for similar findings in Alberta, see The Alberta 
Secretariat, “A Plan for Alberta: Ending Homelessness in 10 Years” (October 2008),  
online: <http://www.housing.alberta.ca/documents/PlanForAB_Secretariat_final.pdf >. 
19
 John Fraser, Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation; Jennifer Ramsay, Advocacy Centre for Tenants 
Ontario; Peter Rosenthal, Barrister, Roach, Schwartz; Tracy Heffernan, Kensington-Bellwoods Community Legal 
Services. 
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with people with lived experience of homelessness, community activists, students, and lawyers. 
That meeting marked the beginning of a lively conversation. It also marked an evolution in deep, 
long-term community organizing. And it has fed an evolution in public discourse to understand 
housing not only as a necessity for human survival, but to see the systemic erosion of housing 
security as a violation of fundamental human rights. 
Soon after the initial workshop in 2008, the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario 
(ACTO)20 launched the inaugural Right to Housing (R2H) Coalition meeting, which pulled 
together a wide range of individuals and groups with a deep concern for housing security.21 For a 
full year the Coalition discussed, debated, and argued about whether we should launch a legal 
challenge to assert the right to adequate housing in Canada. When four extraordinary individuals 
and one organization stepped forward as applicants, the Coalition decided to proceed with a 
constitutional challenge. 
It is critical that, from the outset, the Right to Housing challenge has been built from the 
ground up through collaborative efforts by a broad coalition of individuals and community 
organizations. In keeping with Justice Yacoob’s admonition, this has never been a case of 
“lawyers going it alone.”22 This collaborative process has been accountable and responsive to the 
goals of those with lived experience, who were clear from the beginning that they were not 
seeking monetary damages. Instead, they want real, meaningful, systemic change that will build 
a future where housing security can be realized for all. 
There is a long-standing debate politically and academically about the capacity of 
litigation to advance social transformation for those who are marginalized.23 That concern about 
the utility of litigation was seriously considered in the lead up to the Charter challenge. Is the 
dialectic between rights and politics too unpredictable and vulnerable to co-optation to help those 
who are marginalized? Can those who are marginalized expect their realities to be understood 
and protected by those in power to whom those realities are alien or threatening to their own 
established privilege? Does framing a claim as a rights claim disempower a social movement by 
placing undue reliance on the courts to rectify social power imbalances? At the same time, 
however, this debate recognizes that rights skepticism is, in large measure, a luxury that is only 
truly available for those who already enjoy an experience of rights. Opting out of rights discourse 
is something that marginalized communities do at their peril. As Patricia Williams has written, 
                                                 
20
 The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario is a provincial legal clinic focusing on housing and human rights 
funded by Legal Aid Ontario. 
21
 A few of the founding organizations included the Dream Team (psychiatric survivors advocating for supportive 
housing), Holland Bloorview Kids Rehabilitation Hospital, the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation, 
Sistering (a drop-in for homeless women), the June Callwood Centre for Young Women, the Social Rights 
Advocacy Centre, the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee, and the Children’s Aid Society (Toronto). For a complete 
list of all the individuals and organizations that have supported or been involved with the right to housing coalition, 
see: <http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-to-housing/list-of-organizations-and-individuals-who-have-participated-in-
andor-endorsed-the-right-to-housing.html>. 
22
 Yacoob, supra note 1. 
23
 See, e.g. Judy Fudge, “What Do We Mean by Law and Social Transformation?” (1990) 5 Cdn J Law & Society 
47; E M Schnieder, “The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement” (1986) 61 
NYUL Rev 589; Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989); Allan 
Hutchinson, “Charter Litigation and Social Change: Legal Battles and Society Wars”, in Charter Litigation, R.J. 
Sharpe, ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987); Alan Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic 
Strategies” (1990) 17:3 Journal of Law and Society 309. 
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“[Rights elevate] … one’s status from human body to social being”24 because through the 
articulation of rights, a group’s experiences acquire public value, are understood as entitlements 
of social citizenship, and demand a remedy. Ultimately, while it involves risks, litigation is a 
valid and at times necessary field of engagement both as a process of movement building and as 
a defence of core entitlements because, 
 
[l]aw is an enormously powerful discourse, both ideologically and practically. It 
distributes social power and structures the ways in which we understand and value 
experiences by granting public legitimacy to particular ways of interacting. Legal 
rights are normative; they identify the boundaries of acceptable social interaction, 
shape an individual’s [and a community’s] sense of self, and impose a social 
responsibility to achieve in practice the ideals that are articulated in formal laws. 
Legal rights thus have intrinsic value because, once articulated as formal principles, 
they change the way society identifies injuries and recognizes an entitlement to 
restitution.25 
 
In this context of recognizing the benefits and risks of rights claims, it is important for 
our Coalition that litigation has been just one strategy of many. While recognizing the role of 
litigation in shifting entrenched discourses, the Right to Housing Coalition has engaged in an 
extensive process of community organizing, mobilization, and alliance building.26 We have 
participated in demonstrations to call for affordable housing with groups across the country. We 
have been involved in postcard campaigns to encourage the federal government to recognize 
housing as a human right. We have lobbied both the federal and provincial governments, 
including lobbying on two federal bills that would have required the adoption of a national 
housing strategy.27 We have provided workshops to students and community organizations 
across Canada and begun the process of building a national coalition. We have never forgotten 
that there “ … is no option, really, to old-fashioned, back-breaking political mobilization.”28 The 
litigation and its outcome are neither the only nor the dominant narratives. They are one part of a 
larger reality of community engagement, used to strengthen and empower the community but 
always backed up by “…marches, media, legal education and social mobilization.”29 
While the litigation is just one piece of the fight for the right to housing, the legal issues it 
raises are important and warrant examination in their own right for the ways in which they push 
the boundaries of our thinking about constitutional rights and obligations. To that end, this article 
                                                 
24
 Patricia J Williams, “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights” (1987) 22 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 401 at 416. 
25
 Fay Faraday, “Dealing with Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Promise and Limitations of Human Rights 
Discourse” (1994) 32:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 33 at 36, see also 35–40. 
26
 The issue of community mobilizing is addressed in more detail in Yutaka Dirks’ contribution to this collection: 
“Community Campaigns for the Right to Housing: Lessons from the R2H Coalition of Ontario.” 
27
 Bill C-304, An Act to ensure secure, adequate, accessible and affordable housing for Canadians was a private 
member’s bill introduced in 2010 at the time of a Conservative minority government. The bill garnered the support 
of the Liberals, New Democrats and Bloc Quebecois members of Parliament. It would have passed but for the 
proroguing of government in March 2011; see Parliament of Canada (Private Member’s Bill – C-304, second 
reading (40-3)). The now Conservative majority government voted against the Bill and it was defeated at 2nd 
reading: see also Parliament of Canada (Private Member’s Bill – C-400, (41-1).  
28
 Arundhati Roy, Public Power in the Age of Empire (New York: Seven Stories Press 2004) at 40. 
29
 Mark Heywood, “South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to 
Realize the Right to Health” (2009) 1:1 J Human Rights Practice 14–36 at 22 [Heywood, “South Africa”]. 
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proceeds as follows. Part III provides an overview of the launch of the litigation, the nature and 
context of the litigation, and a brief history of what has transpired over the last five years. Parts 
IV and V examine the legal arguments advanced in the case with respect to sections 7 and 15 of 
the Charter grounded in a broader poverty law analysis. Part VI touches on the issue of legal 
remedies. Part VII concludes with some thoughts about the nature of socio-economic rights and 
returns to the notion of community organizing. 
 
III. THE RIGHT TO HOUSING CHALLENGE 
 
A. FIVE APPLICANTS STEP FORWARD 
 
When four extraordinary individuals and one small but mighty community organization stepped 
forward as applicants, the Right to Housing Coalition decided to proceed with the litigation. The 
evidence in the application describes their situations as follows. 
Ansar Mahmood suffered a catastrophic industrial accident that left him unable to work. 
He has four children: one child, Rohail, has severe cerebral palsy and must use a wheelchair; 
another is autistic. The family of six lives in a two bedroom non-accessible apartment. They are 
on the waiting list for an affordable accessible home. It could take twelve years before they are 
housed. By that time, Rohail, who currently must be carried from room to room as the hallways 
are too narrow for his wheelchair, will be twenty years old. Mr. Mahmood writes, 
 
[t]he apartment is extremely crowded. There is not even room for a dresser to store 
our clothes. Nor is it accessible for a person in wheelchair. The bathtub is too small 
for Rohail’s bath chair. Rohail should be sleeping in a hospital bed with sides but, 
again, we do not have sufficient space. The apartment is too small and too crowded 
to manoeuvre his wheelchair around. Mostly we have to leave him on his bed in his 
room.30 
For several years Janice Arsenault experienced the bliss of having a home and 
community. She writes, “[i]t was the best time of my life. I had safe, secure, affordable housing. 
My children were loved and well cared for. I had a husband who loved me. I had a husband I 
loved.”31 
But when her husband died suddenly after routine surgery, Janice and her two young sons 
found themselves homeless. Taken in by friends and neighbours, she and her children couch 
surfed for ten months until their welcome ran out and they were forced to move to a shelter. 
Shelters for the homeless are mostly horrific places in Canada: there is violence, bedbugs, and 
theft.32 Many lose all their belongings within a short period of time.33 Heartbroken, Janice sent 
her children to live with her parents 2,000 kilometres away; she ended up on the streets. Janice is 
currently housed but her rent consumes 64 per cent of her modest income, placing her at high 
risk of homelessness. 
                                                 
30
 Affidavit of Ansar Mahmood, sworn 13 May 2010, paras 16–17, on file with the authors. 
31
 Affidavit of Janice Arsenault, sworn 12 May 2010. para 11, on file with the authors. 
32
 See for instance, Erika Khandor & Kate Mason, Street Health Report 2007, Toronto: September 2007 at 14–15, 
online: <http://www.streethealth.ca/downloads/the-street-health-report-2007.pdf>.  
33
 Despite the appalling conditions it costs on average $2000 per month for a bed in a homeless shelter; see Gaetz, 
“Real Cost of Homelessness,” supra note 18 at 5. 
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Jennifer Tanudjaja is a young single mother who was apprehended from her family at the 
age of twelve. She is a straight “A” college student with high hopes for her future and that of her 
children. She spends her entire social assistance cheque on rent for a two-bedroom apartment in 
Toronto and tries to subsist on a child tax benefit to feed herself and her children, buy clothes, 
and pay for transportation and other costs. She lives in fear of homelessness. She writes, 
 
[i]f I had access to a housing subsidy, I wouldn’t have to worry all the time about 
how I was going to pay the rent, or afford a metro pass, or pay for my school books. I 
wouldn’t have to wonder about whether I have the transit fare to take my boys to a 
doctor’s appointment. I wouldn’t have to worry about the cost of fruit and vegetables 
and whether I can afford to feed my sons healthy food. I wouldn’t be constantly 
anxious about ending up in a homeless shelter with my boys.34 
Brian DuBourdieu lives on the streets of Toronto. He lost his job when he was diagnosed 
with cancer and became severely depressed. Without a pay cheque he could no longer pay his 
rent. He lost his home and has been on the waiting list for affordable housing for four years. He 
writes, 
[l]iving in affordable housing would allow me to completely change my life. The 
stability housing would give me would relieve the constant stress I feel from being 
homeless. The ability to control my own diet would improve my health and I would 
feel secure knowing my medications would not be stolen. I am convinced that if I 
were able to find housing I would be able to get help for my mental health and 
addiction problems and would eventually be able to get a stable job and contribute to 
society again. I would love to have a place to hang my hat.35 
 
The fifth applicant was the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA), an 
Ontario-based non-profit organization that tackles housing and human rights issues by working 
with low-income tenants and people who are homeless, providing advice, direct services, and 
public education. CERA is a membership-based organization and many of its members have 
themselves experienced homelessness. The precarious and unsettled lives of individuals who are 
homeless and inadequately housed present an enormous barrier to engaging in protracted 
litigation and enforcing rights. It is in itself a concrete example of how homelessness erodes the 
capacity to experience and assert fundamental entitlements in society. In this context, the 
presence of a public interest applicant was critical in supporting the sustainability of what was 
anticipated to be lengthy litigation.36 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Affidavit of Jennifer Tanudjaja, sworn 17 May 2010, para 38, on file with the authors, [Tanudjaja, “Affidavit”]. 
35
 Affidavit of Brian DuBourdieu, sworn 4 October 2010, para 25, on file with the authors. 
36
 The importance of public interest applicants in supporting litigation by marginalized populations has been well 
recognized by the courts. See, e.g. Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against 
Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 SCR 524; Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 CanLII 47783 (ON 
SC). 
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B. CONTEXT AND THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL CLAIM 
 
Under our Constitution’s division of powers, both the federal and provincial governments have 
jurisdiction to make laws and policies relating to housing. For decades, both levels of 
government have been actively engaged in designing, implementing, and delivering programs 
integrally related to ensuring access to adequate housing. While the federal government 
historically “played the major role in shaping how Canada’s housing stock was financed and 
allocated, and the degree to which critical social needs for adequate housing were met,” 
provincial and municipal governments “also played important roles in the shaping and 
administering of housing and social programs, often supplementing or cost sharing federal 
programs.”37  
Canada’s active and central role in relation to affordable housing began as early as 1935 
with the adoption of the Dominion Housing Act. It was furthered in 1946 with the establishment 
of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (now the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation). Since then, Canada has had an active role in supporting access to affordable 
housing through programs such as: 
 
(a) direct funding for the construction of affordable rental housing units; 
(b) government administration of affordable rental housing through a wide variety of 
public housing, non-profit housing, co-operative, and rent supplement rental units; 
(c) programs of affordable housing funded through cost-sharing arrangements with 
the provinces; and 
(d) the provision of rent supplements to tenants in private rental units. 
From the end of the Second World War until the late 1970s, the Canadian housing system 
was explicitly directed to ensuring that residents of Canada were securely housed in adequate 
housing. This perspective was encapsulated in a 1973 speech in the House of Commons by the 
Honourable Ron Basford, then federal Minister of State for Urban Affairs (a federal ministry that 
no longer exists). In introducing amendments to the National Housing Act, Minister Basford 
clearly stated that our society–and our government–has an obligation to see that all people are 
adequately housed: 
 
…good housing at reasonable cost is a social right of every citizen of this country. … 
[T]his must be our objective, our obligation, and our goal. The legislation which I am 
proposing to the House today is an expression of the government’s policy, part of a 
broad plan, to try to make this right and this objective a reality.38 
 
Over the next two decades the federal government funded more than 600,000 
affordable homes across Canada.39 
                                                 
37
 See J. David Hulchanski, Affidavit, Tanudjaja. v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario 
(2011), ON SC File No. CV-10-403688, at para 29; see online: <http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-to-
housing/application-material.html > . 
38
 House of Commons Debates, 29th Parl, 1st Sess, (15 March 1973) at 2257 (Honourable Ron Basford). 
39
 See Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra note 2 at para 19. 
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In pursuing protections against homelessness and inadequate housing, federal and 
provincial laws and government policies have been built upon three important and 
interconnected components: 
 
(a) access to affordable housing; 
(b) income support to ensure the affordability of housing; and 
(c) physically accessible housing and housing with supports for community living for 
persons with disabilities. 
Since the mid-1990s, each of those three pillars of housing security has been undermined 
and dismantled through active choices made by the federal and provincial governments. As is set 
out in detail in the sections that follow, both levels of governments have enacted or amended 
laws and instituted changes to policies, programs, and services which have resulted in mass 
homelessness and inadequate housing.40 
 
C. ERODING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
 
Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing to the present, the federal government has taken a 
number of decisions which have eroded access to affordable housing including: (i) cancelling 
funding for the construction of new social housing; (ii) withdrawing from the administration of 
affordable rental housing; and (iii) phasing out funding for affordable housing projects under 
cost-sharing agreements with the provinces. At the same time, the Ontario government has taken 
its own decisions that erode access to affordable housing, including: (i) terminating the 
provincial program for constructing new social housing; (ii) amending legislation to eliminate 
protection against converting affordable rental housing to non-rental uses and eliminating rent 
regulation; (iii) downloading the cost and administration of existing social housing to 
municipalities and responsibility for funding development of new social housing to 
municipalities which lack the tax base to support such programs; and (iv) heightening insecurity 
of tenancy by creating administrative procedures that facilitate evictions.41 
As of December 2013, there were 165,069 households in Ontario on the waiting list for 
affordable housing.42 The waiting list has increased every year since 2006 and “For every 
household housed … three more apply.”43 On average it takes almost four years for a household 
on the waiting list to receive affordable housing, but in some communities—and  particularly for 
families—the waiting time can be considerably longer, even exceeding ten years.44 
 
D. ERODING ACCESS TO INCOME SUPPORTS FOR AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING 
 
At the same time that policies were being implemented that eroded access to affordable housing, 
the federal and provincial governments amended legislation and altered policies in various 
                                                 
40
 Ibid at para 17. 
41
 Ibid at para 12-19 and 29–44. 
42
 Waiting Lists Survey 2014, (Ontario: ONPHA’s Report on Waiting List Statistics for Ontario, 2014) at 4 [Waiting 
Lists Survey]. 
43
 Ibid at 5. 
44
 Ibid at 6. 
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income support programs. These changes increasingly undermined the ability of low income 
tenants to pay their rent. 
Until 1996, federal transfer payments for social assistance under the Canada Assistance 
Plan (CAP) were conditional on the provinces providing social assistance at a level that would 
cover the cost of basic necessities, including housing.45 In 1996, the federal transfer payments 
were restructured by repealing this legislated standard. Under the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer, which replaced CAP, federal transfer payments are no longer tied to these substantive 
thresholds. At the same time, Canada implemented changes to the Employment Insurance Act, 
which resulted in far fewer unemployed workers qualifying for benefits upon losing their jobs, 
with the result that more unemployed workers must rely on social assistance instead.46 
In October 1995, the Ontario government cut social assistance rates by 21.6%, one of the 
most dramatic social assistance decreases across the country. Since that time, Ontario has 
maintained the social assistance shelter allowances at levels that are far below what is required to 
secure rental housing on the private market. When the provincial government eliminated most 
rent controls in 1998, rents increased dramatically and evictions for arrears of rent escalated. In 
2012-13, 75,069 eviction applications were filed at the Landlord and Tenant Board; of these 80% 
were for arrears.47 
A typical example illustrates the impact of these cumulative federal and provincial 
legislative changes. In 1994, under Ontario Works, a single mother with two children received a 
maximum monthly shelter allowance of $707; the average rent for a two-bedroom apartment in 
Toronto was $784, leaving a shortfall of $77. In 2012, the maximum shelter allowance was $641; 
the average rent for a two-bedroom apartment was $1,183, leaving a shortfall of $542 per 
month.48 This entirely predictable gap results in many social assistance recipients becoming 
homeless or being forced to forgo other necessities—such as food—in order to maintain their 
housing.49 
 
E. LACK OF ACCESSIBLE HOUSING AND HOUSING SUPPORTS FOR 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
 
Finally, the federal and provincial governments have implemented a range of policy changes that 
leave persons with disabilities particularly vulnerable to homelessness. 
                                                 
45
 See Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra note 2 at 14. 
46
 See Falling Behind: Ontario’s Backslide into Widening Inequality, Growing Poverty and Cuts to Social Program, 
A Report of the Ontario Common Front (Ontario: A Report of the Ontario Common Front, 2012) [“Falling 
Behind”]. At p41 the reports notes that,“[c]urrently only a shocking 40% of unemployed workers across Canada, 
26% in Ontario and 22% in Toronto who pay premiums into the Employment Insurance fund actually qualify for 
employment insurance benefits. As a result, the vast majority of workers, upon losing their jobs become dependent 
on social assistance.” Meanwhile the accrued $57 billion EI surplus was quietly transferred into the federal 
government’s general revenues: see Gregory Thomas, “Canada’s EI surplus: now you see it now you don’t” (6 
February 2013) Canada Free Press, Canadian Taxpayers Federation (blog), online: < 
http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/canadas-ei-surplus-now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t>. 
47
 Social Justice Tribunals Ontario, 2012–2013 Annual Report at 29–30, online at: 
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@sjc/documents/abstract/ec166423.pdf>. 
48
 See Tracy Heffernan, “The Right to Housing Campaign: In the Courts & the Community,” PPP: Advocacy Centre 
For Tenants Ontario (2013) at 14, online: <http://www.acto.ca/assets/files/TrainingSymposium/R2H-symposium-
presentation-October-2013-PDF.pdf>. 
49
 See “Falling Behind,” supra note 46 at 26. 
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 Existing affordable housing stock is often physically inaccessible to persons with 
disabilities.50 Meanwhile, sufficient new accessible affordable housing is not being built. As a 
result, it is not uncommon for people with disabilities to wait ten years or longer to get off the 
waiting lists and into affordable housing that can accommodate their needs. 
 Moreover, government policies of deinstitutionalizing persons with psycho-social and 
intellectual disabilities in the absence of providing effective mechanisms to support their 
independent community living has resulted in widespread homelessness among persons with 
these disabilities. In addition, persons with psycho-social and intellectual disabilities are often 
discharged from medical care without appropriate attention to whether they have access to 
adequate housing with appropriate supports.51 
There has been international critique of these policies. The United Nations (UN) human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies, for instance, have expressed concern at Canadian governments’ 
failure to provide adequate supports for community living for persons with mental disabilities, 
noting that in some instances this has resulted in these individuals being forced to live in 
detention solely because of a lack of community-based housing with supports.52  
 
F. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
 
All of these deliberate actions by the two governments—actions to amend legislation and to 
amend or withdraw policies and programs that had previously protected rights to adequate 
housing—were made in a context in which Canada has numerous explicit commitments in 
international human rights instruments to safeguard and promote the right to adequate housing. 
In particular, these international human rights instruments with respect to economic, social, and 
cultural rights expressly commit Canada “to take measures to the maximum of its available 
resources … with a view to achieve progressively the full realization of these rights,” including 
the right to adequate housing.53 The actions by the two governments then appeared to run in 
direct contradiction to these commitments. This squarely raised the question that has been skirted 
in Charter litigation to date, about whether and to what extent social and economic rights are 
justiciable under the Charter.54 To what extent does the Charter protect social and economic 
                                                 
50
 See Waiting Lists Survey,” supra note 42 at 9. 
51
 See Michael Bach, Affidavit, Tanudjaja v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2011), 
ON SC File No. CV-10-403688; and see Catherine Frazee & Esther Ignagni, Affidavit, Tanudjaja v Attorney 
General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2011), ON SC File No. CV-10-403688, online: 
<http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-to-housing/application-material.html>. 
52
 See Tanudjaja v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2010), ON SC File No. CV-10-
403688 (Amended Notice of Application) at para 26, [“Amended Notice of Application”]. 
53See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR, Supp 
No. 16 at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS. 3, entered into force 3 January 1976, Article 2 [ICESCR]. 
54
 Lorne M. Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada, 2d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 
2012) at 242–244 reviews the existing law on the justiciability of social and economic rights and concludes that, 
“[i]t is striking that, despite the rights jurisprudence which has developed under the Charter, such uncertainty 
remains with respect to a question of fundamental importance to the scope of judicial review of government action. 
For the moment, the justiciability of social and economic rights under the Charter remains an open question.” For a 
broader discussion of socio-economic rights see: Margot Young et al, ed, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and 
Legal Activism, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Sandra Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre (eds), The Supreme Court of 
Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat, (Markham, ON: Lexis-Nexis Canada Inc., 
2010); Malcolm Langford, ed, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Helena Alviar Garcia, et al, Social and Economic Rights in 
Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries, (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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rights? To what extent must section 7 and section 15 be interpreted in light of Canada’s 
international human rights commitments?  
Canada has ratified a range of international human rights instruments that expressly 
recognize housing as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 
in 1948, states, 
 
[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing 
of himself [or herself] and of his [or her] family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services … 55 
 
In 1951, the UN General Assembly drafted two covenants to implement the Universal 
Declaration: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).56 The right to 
housing is defined most clearly in Article 11(1) of the latter which commits signatory states to 
“take appropriate steps to ensure the realization” of “the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself [or herself] and his [or her] family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing … ”. 
Unfortunately the division into two covenants was not merely symbolic. The ICCPR 
established an international supervision mechanism with the United Nations system and imposed 
on states an immediate duty of implementation. In contrast, the mechanisms created under the 
ICESCR were less developed and imposed only a duty that states take steps “… with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of these rights” to the maximum of their “available 
resources”.57 
These international covenants laid the foundation for the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. However, the privileging of civil and political over socio-economic rights has seeped 
into several Charter decisions, particularly at the lower court levels. This has gone neither 
unnoticed nor unchallenged. While querying the timidity of both lawyers and litigants in 
advancing socio-economic claims, former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Louise Arbour 
stated: 
 
The approach of Canada’s courts has not escaped the notice of the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In 1998, when reviewing 
Canada’s compliance with its international obligations, the Committee stated that it 
had received information about a number of cases in which claims were brought by 
people living in poverty, alleging that government policies denied the claimants and 
their children adequate food, clothing and housing. The Committee noted that 
provincial governments “have urged upon their courts … an interpretation of the 
                                                 
55
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III) U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13 at 71, UN Doc. 
A/810 (1948) (art. 25); Canada has subsequently guaranteed the right to adequate housing through the following 
covenants: Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination; 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
56
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp No 16 at 52, UN 
Doc A/6316 91966), 999 U.N.T.S.171 entered into force 23 March  1976, hereinafter ICCPR; and ICESCR, supra 
note 53. 
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 Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross, “Introduction: Do We Need Social Rights? Questions in the Era of 
Globalisation, Privatisation, and the Diminished Welfare State” in Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross, eds, 
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Charter which would deny any protection of Covenant rights and consequently leave 
the complainants without the basic necessities of life and without any legal remedy.” 
It is important to stress that the Committee is not stating that governments have an 
obligation to directly provide all things to all peoples. What it has pointed out, 
however, is that courts in Canada have “routinely opted for an interpretation of the 
Charter which excludes protection of the right to an adequate standard of living and 
other Covenant rights.”58 
 
This litigation, then, responds to Justice Arbour’s call to take social and economic rights 
seriously and to ensure that Charter rights are meaningful for those most in need of the Charter’s 
protection. 
 
G. ESSENCE OF THE LEGAL CLAIM 
 
The Right to Housing challenge argues that the rights to life, security of the person, and equality 
must be interpreted in light of Canada’s international human rights obligations to provide 
meaningful protection under section 7 and section 15 for those who are homeless or at risk of 
homelessness. 
 The essence of the Right to Housing legal claim is that the federal and provincial 
governments have taken deliberate actions to amend laws, policies and programs in the areas of: 
(a) affordable housing; (b) income supports to ensure affordability of housing; and (c) physically 
accessible housing for persons with disabilities and housing with supports for community living 
for persons with disabilities. They have done so in a way that predictably creates and sustains 
increasingly widespread homelessness and inadequate housing. In adopting and implementing 
these legal and policy changes, Canada and Ontario have taken no measures or taken inadequate 
measures to address the impact of these changes on groups most at risk of homelessness. They 
have failed to undertake appropriate strategic coordination to ensure that government programs 
effectively protect those who are homeless or most at risk of homelessness. As a result, they have 
created conditions that lead to, support, and sustain homelessness and inadequate housing and 
have produced severe health consequences and death among the most marginalized groups in 
society contrary to section 7 and section 15 of the Charter. 
 A number of UN bodies responsible for monitoring Canada’s compliance with 
international human rights commitments have repeatedly raised grave concerns about the effects 
of homelessness and inadequate housing on vulnerable groups and the failure to take positive 
measures to address these issues. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, have repeatedly recommended that 
Canada adopt a national strategy to ensure that the right to adequate housing is implemented on 
an urgent basis to address this “national emergency.” They recommend that this strategy be 
developed in collaboration with provincial and territorial governments.59 Despite these concerns 
and recommendations, Canada and Ontario have failed to implement a coordinated strategy to 
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 Louise Arbour, “’Freedom from want’ – from charity to entitlement Libérer du besoin: de la charité à la justice” 
(LaFontaine-Baldwin Lecture delivered at the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3 March 
2005) [unpublished]. 
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 Miloon Khotari, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, and on the right of non-discrimination in this context, Mission to Canada (9 to 22 
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reduce homelessness. Shocking, but true: Canada is the only major country in the world without 
a national housing plan.60 And despite the fact that Canada has repeatedly represented in the 
international forum that the guarantee of security of the person under section 7 of the Charter 
ensures that persons are not to be deprived of the basic necessities of life, and that the Charter is 
the primary source of legal protection for the rights found in the ICESCR, including the right to 
adequate housing.61 As set out below, the governments’ responses to the Right to Housing claim 
were to move to strike the application in its entirety on the basis that the rights claimed did not 
exist under the Charter and were non-justiciable. 
 
H. THE LEGAL PROCESS 
 
In May 2010 the applicants issued a Notice of Application under Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure62 advising the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario that 
they would bring an application for violation of the Charter and international law.63  
After issuing the Notice of Application, the applicants began the long, arduous work of 
amassing the evidentiary record. Twelve expert witnesses gave freely of their time to draft expert 
witness affidavits, including: Miloon Kothari, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Housing; 
Catherine Frazee, the former Ontario Human Rights Commissioner; Charles Taiowisakarere Hill, 
Executive Director of the National Aboriginal Housing Association; and Dr. Stephen Hwang, a 
renowned doctor at St. Michael’s Hospital who has conducted research on the correlation 
between inadequate housing and homelessness, serious illness, and mortality. 
The 10,000 page evidentiary record was served on the Attorneys General of Ontario and 
Canada in November 2011. In response, the Attorneys General requested that they be granted a 
commensurate amount of time to create a responding record. Instead, six months later, on the 
second anniversary of the issued Notice, the Attorneys General advised they would bring 
motions to strike the application in its entirety without a hearing on the evidence.  
 
 
 
I. THE GOVERNMENTS’ MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE LEGAL CLAIM 
 
A motion to strike64 is intended to strike out a legal proceeding where it discloses no “reasonable 
cause of action” and it is “plain and obvious” that there is “no chance of success.”65 Such 
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 Michael Shapcott, “A Housing Year in Review And A Walk Through Numbers” (23 December 2011) Wellesley 
Institute (blog), online: <http://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/housing/a-housing-year-in-review-and-a-walk-through-
the-numbers/>; and for a history of the erosion of the national housing plan over the past several decades; also see 
Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra note 2. 
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 See Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties (Canada), HRI/CORE/1/Add.91 (12 January 
1998) at para 127; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Summary Record of the 
Fifth Meeting, E/C.12/1993/SR.5 (25 May 1993) at paras 3, 21; Government of Canada, Responses to the 
Supplementary Questions to Canada’s Third Report on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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 Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 14. 
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 See “Amended Notice of Application” and Expert Witness Affidavits, supra note 52, online: 
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motions are generally used to strike out statements of claim. Their purpose is much murkier 
when it comes to striking out complex Charter applications.66  
It is also an awkward procedural tool in this instance. Whereas a statement of claim 
details all the material facts pertaining to a claim and can be used to paint a complete picture of 
the litigation, the same is not true of a notice of application. A notice of application does not set 
out the material facts, but only the more general legal grounds for the claim. On an application, 
the facts are established in the affidavits that form the evidentiary record. In the Right to Housing 
challenge, the 10,000 pages of affidavit evidence are the bedrock of the application; the breadth 
and depth of the record demonstrates that these are not issues to be argued in the abstract. Yet the 
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that no evidence can be before the court on a motion 
to strike.67 
Despite the inappropriateness of using motions to strike in Charter cases, increasingly it 
would appear that this is the Attorneys’ General tool of choice.68 It may be non-democratic but it 
is effective. The pockets of non-profit organizations are not deep and resources are extremely 
limited; thus a motion to strike can serve to quell dissent and prevent the voices of marginalized 
groups from being heard before the courts on a full evidentiary record. 
Disturbed by the governments’ move to strike down litigation without a full hearing, 
several groups applied to intervene on the motion including disability rights groups, low income 
tenants, and Amnesty International.69 In March 2013, the motions for leave to intervene were 
heard over two days at the Superior Court of Justice.70  
On several occasions the judge asserted that the case was “political” and not “legal”, that 
these were “social” problems. After commenting that he would prefer more “academic” and “less 
partisan” intervenors–the inference being that if you are poor you are somehow partisan, an 
inference which corporations, for instance, seem to escape entirely–the judge permitted the 
following coalitions and one academic organization to intervene: i) Amnesty International/the 
International Network for Social and Cultural Rights; ii) the Charter Committee on Poverty 
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 A motion to strike pleadings in Ontario is brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 62, Rule 
21.01(b) and Rule 21.01(2)(b) which provide:  
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Issues/Pivot Legal Society/the Income Security Advocacy Centre/Justice for Girls; and iii) the 
David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights.71 
The motion to strike was heard over three days in May 2013. Without the benefit of 
evidence, the judge mused about the nature and root causes of homelessness and inadequate 
housing and whether the government could be held responsible for either. He worried about the 
costs that might be incurred. Of course, had the judge been able to review the evidentiary record, 
he would have had access to evidence that it costs half the amount to house people than it does to 
keep them homeless.72 Justice Lederer wrote, 
 
[b]y its nature, such an application would require consideration of how our society 
distributes and redistributes wealth. General questions that reference, among many 
other issues, assistance to those in poverty, the levels of housing supports and income 
supplements, the basis on which people may be evicted from where they live and the 
treatment of those with psycho-social and intellectual disabilities are important, but 
the courtroom is not the place for their review.73 
 
The court’s decision is rooted in an inappropriate and unrealistic baseline for considering 
whether marginalized groups have been made worse off by government choices: current 
inadequate state action versus a hypothetical state in which the government provides no services 
whatsoever. Yet in a modern welfare state, government regulation infuses so many spheres of 
social interaction and governments wield so much power over access to resources that not only 
direct action but also inertia or inaction must be called to account.74  
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice ultimately allowed the governments’ motions, 
striking the Right to Housing claim in its entirety. The Court found that the section 7 claim had 
no reasonable chance of success because there can be no positive obligations under the 
Charter.75 The Court found that the section 15 claim had no reasonable chance of success again 
because there could be no positive obligations under the Charter but also because the 
governments’ actions did not cause homelessness, homelessness was not an analogous ground, 
and the claims on distinct and intersecting grounds would necessarily fail.76 The Court further 
held that the claim was political and therefore non-justiciable, and the remedies—particularly 
requiring governments to develop a national housing strategy and to require court supervision to 
ensure compliance with the orders—were not justiciable.77 The claimants appealed the ruling on 
all grounds.78  
The issues at stake on the appeal are significant not only for this particular case but 
engage issues that are of fundamental importance to the substance and process of Charter 
litigation generally. This was reflected in the extraordinary fact that eight interveners and 
intervener coalitions, representing sixteen separate well-established public institutions with 
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provincial, federal and international mandates, were granted leave to intervene on the appeal of 
this motion.79 The interveners and intervener coalitions were: (i) David Asper Centre for 
Constitutional Rights; (ii) Amnesty International Canada and International Network for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; (iii) Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund; (iv) 
Charter Committee on Poverty, Pivot Legal Society and Justice for Girls; (v) ARCH Disability 
Law Centre, the Dream Team, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network and HIV/AIDS Legal Clinic 
Ontario; (vi) Ontario Human Rights Commission; (vii) Colour of Poverty/Colour of Change; and 
(viii) Income Security Advocacy Clinic, the ODSP Action Coalition, and the Steering Committee 
on Social Assistance. 
The appeal was heard over three days in May 2014. In December 2014 the Court issued a 
divided ruling.80 The majority of the Court of Appeal, per Pardu JA, dismissed the appeal on the 
basis that the application is not justiciable as “there is no sufficient legal component to engage 
the decision-making capacity of the courts.”81 The majority held that the claim was essentially a 
political claim rather than a rights claim stating “this application is not justiciable. In essence the 
application asserts that Canada and Ontario have given insufficient priority to issues of 
homelessness and inadequate housing.”82 The majority found that the systemic nature of the 
claim rendered it non-justiciable because it failed to follow the “archetypal feature of Charter 
challenges” which present a challenge to a single law or single application of a law.83 The 
majority mistakenly characterized the claims as asserting “a general freestanding right to 
adequate housing”84 and found that there “is no judicially discoverable and manageable standard 
for assessing in general whether housing policy is adequate or whether sufficient priority has 
been given in general to the needs of the homeless. This is not a question that can be resolved by 
application of law, but rather it engages the accountability of legislatures.”85 The majority further 
held in one brief paragraph that the remedies sought were non-justiciable because they were 
beyond the institutional competence of the courts.86 Having determined that the claim was per se 
non-justiciable, the majority held that “it is not necessary to explore the limits, in a justiciable 
context of the extent to which positive obligations may be imposed on government to remedy 
violations of the Charter, a door left slightly ajar in Gosselin v Quebec … Nor is it necessary to 
determine whether homelessness can be an analogous ground of discrimination under s. 15 of the 
Charter in some contexts.”87 Finally, the majority upheld the motion judge’s ruling that it was 
unreasonable to require that the motions to strike be brought before the record was served.88  
In a strong dissent, Feldman JA would have allowed the appeal. She found that the claim 
was justiciable under both section 7 and section 15 and that it was “a serious attempt” that “seeks 
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 Ibid at para 33, Pardu JA. 
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 Ibid at para 34, Pardu JA. 
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 Ibid at para 37, Pardu JA. 
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to have the court address whether government action and inaction that results in homelessness 
and inadequate housing is subject to Charter scrutiny and justifies a Charter remedy.” She 
wrote, 
 
[i]n my view, it was an error of law to strike this application at the pleadings stage. 
The application raises significant issues of public importance. The appellants’ 
approach to Charter claims is admittedly novel. But given the jurisprudential journey 
of the Charter’s development to date, it is neither plain nor obvious that the 
appellants’ claims are doomed to fail.89  
 
Feldman JA found that the motion judge had made extensive errors of law in assessing 
both the section 7 and section 15 claims, including: (i) erring in his characterization of the 
section 7 claim and stating it in an overly broad manner; (ii) erring in stating that the section 7 
jurisprudence on whether positive obligations can be imposed on government is settled; (iii) 
erring in purporting to define the law in critical areas of jurisprudence on a motion to strike and 
drawing conclusions of law in a new way; (iv) determining the very legal issues under both 
section 7 and section 15 that are intended to be addressed by an application judge on a full record 
and full argument on the merits; and (v) making factual findings that are not in the pleadings, in 
the absence of evidence, in order to reach those determinations.90 Beyond this catalogue of 
serious errors, Feldman JA held that the “larger error was to strike the claim without allowing a 
court to review the evidentiary record assembled by the appellants.”91 Feldman JA ruled that the 
claim was justiciable. She found that the justiciability of social and economic rights remains an 
open question in the jurisprudence and that courts have in fact adjudicated poverty-related 
standards in non-Charter cases.92 She found that the question of whether the Charter imposes 
positive obligations on government has also expressly been left open by the Supreme Court.93 
She found that the novel element of bringing a systemic claim and seeking systemic remedies 
presented no barrier to justiciability. Acknowledging the complexity of the claimants’ systemic 
analysis, Feldman JA wrote, “I agree that the broad approach taken in this application is novel 
and a number of procedural as well as conceptual difficulties could arise when the court 
addresses whether the Charter has been infringed, and if appropriate, determines and applies a 
reasonable and workable remedy.” However she concluded that, 
 
the novelty of a claim is not a bar to allowing it to proceed. Although the 
development of Charter jurisprudence has to date followed a fairly consistent 
procedural path, and has involved challenges to particular laws, we are still in the 
early stages of that development. There is no reason to believe that that procedural 
approach is fixed in stone. This application asks the court to view Charter claims 
through a different procedural lens. That novelty is not a reason to strike it out.94 
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Ultimately Feldman JA addressed the high threshold for striking claims on a preliminary 
motion and concluded: 
 
This application is simply not the type of ‘hopeless’ claim for which Rule 21 was 
intended. It has been brought by counsel on behalf of a large, marginalized, 
vulnerable and disadvantaged group who face profound barriers to access to justice. 
It raises issues that are basic to their life and well-being. It is supported by a number 
of credible intervening institutions with considerable expertise in Charter 
jurisprudence and analysis. The appellants put together a significant record to support 
their application. That record should be put before the court.95 
  
At the time of writing, the claimants are seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
Regardless of the outcome on the application for leave and any subsequent appeal, the 
framing of housing security as protected by fundamental constitutional rights is worth examining 
in more detail because the nature of the framing engages fundamental issues of constitutional law 
that are relevant to the next evolution in the accessibility and enforceability of these rights. 
 
IV. THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND SECURITY OF THE 
PERSON: SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER, HOUSING, AND 
HOMELESSNESS 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the three decades since the Charter’s adoption, increasing numbers of Canadians’ lives have 
been shortened and their security lessened by poverty, and the Charter has not provided 
remedies. The Right to Housing challenge asserts that the federal and provincial governments 
have failed to meet their constitutional responsibilities to protect those aspects of housing that are 
fundamental to life and security of the person. The legislative, policy, and program changes they 
have implemented exacerbated housing insecurity and directly contributed to increased 
homelessness and reduced access to adequate housing. They violate the right to life by reducing 
life expectancy of those who are homeless and inadequately housed. They violate security of the 
person by causing significant damage to the physical, mental, and emotional health of those who 
are homeless and inadequately housed. The governments’ actions and policies that have caused 
these deprivations of life and security of the person are not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice because they have been arbitrary and have been implemented without regard 
to the impact on the homeless and inadequately housed. 
The challenge directly engages with three critical issues in section 7 jurisprudence that 
are both unsettled in the case law and subject to extensive critical commentary. The claim 
probes: (a) the extent to which the rights to life and security of the person protect social and 
economic rights that are so fundamental as to be necessities of life; (b) the extent to which 
section 7 imposes positive obligations on government to protect socio-economic rights; and (c) 
the extent to which a government’s actions/inactions may contravene the Charter. 
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The degree to which section 7 protects social and economic rights is unresolved in 
Canadian law. However, there are significant statements in the law that anchor the Right to 
Housing claim. There is obiter in several Supreme Court of Canada judgments, going back to 
1989, that suggests a section 7 claim may successfully challenge governmental failures to 
provide necessities of life. Moreover, there is a powerful dissent in the 2002 case of Gosselin that 
specifically supports such claims.96 The legal principles in that dissent were not rejected by the 
majority. Nonetheless, in the Right to Housing case the Ontario Superior Court of Justice struck 
the section 7 claim. The judge seemed to acknowledge that Gosselin left the door open to pursue 
such an application if an appropriate evidentiary foundation established “hardship.” However, he 
struck the application before any evidence was tendered, relying on two lower court cases97 
decided prior to Gosselin whose holdings are inconsistent with Gosselin. He wrote, 
[a]s of this moment, there is no positive obligation placed on Canada or Ontario, 
arising out of an allegation of a breach of s. 7 of the Charter, having been found to 
apply in circumstances such as this. To the contrary, Clark and Masse demonstrate 
the opposite. It may be that values, attitudes and perspectives will change, but this 
evolution is not sufficient to trigger reconsideration in the lower courts.98 
 
 If this proposition is allowed to stand, the question of whether section 7 can protect 
necessities of life will never be resolved by the Supreme Court. This proposition creates a 
conundrum: the Supreme Court of Canada requires an appropriate evidentiary foundation to 
determine the scope of section 7, but the lower court does not allow evidence to be introduced on 
a motion to strike.  
B. THE LEADING CASE: GOSSELIN V QUÉBEC (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
The section 7 claim in the Right to Housing turns largely on the proper interpretation of both the 
majority and dissenting reasons in Gosselin. That case addresses both the scope of section 7 
protection for necessities of life and government’s positive obligation to protect those rights. The 
Right to Housing application asserts that both the majority and dissenting reasons support the 
conclusion that, if there is a proper evidentiary record, a court can find under section 7 that 
governments have a positive obligation to protect necessities of life, including aspects of 
housing, and that actions or inaction which undermine life and security of the person in this 
context violate the Charter. 
Since 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged the possibility that section 7 
may guarantee positive rights to the necessities of human life, including shelter:  
Lower courts have found that the rubric of “economic rights” embraces a broad 
spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in various international 
covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food, 
clothing and shelter, to traditional property–contract rights. To exclude all of these at 
this early moment in the history of Charter interpretation seems to us to be 
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precipitous. We do not, at this moment, choose to pronounce upon whether those 
economic rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though 
they are of the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic rights.99  
The possibility that section 7 could protect “economic rights fundamental to human life 
or survival” was reaffirmed by the majority in Gosselin.100 This possibility remains open today. 
Gosselin addressed whether reduced social assistance benefits for youth violated the Charter. In 
rejecting the claim concerning “positive rights” to adequate income security, the majority in 
Gosselin did not hold that the application was deficient in law but merely that it was deficient in 
evidence: 
 
The question therefore is not whether s. 7 has ever been—or will ever be—
recognized as creating positive rights. Rather, the question is whether the present 
circumstances warrant a novel application of s. 7 as the basis for a positive state 
obligation to guarantee adequate living standards.  
I conclude that they do not. With due respect for the views of my colleague Arbour J, 
I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence in this case to support the proposed 
interpretation of s. 7. I leave open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain 
life, liberty, or security of the person may be made out in special circumstances. 
However, this is not such a case. The impugned program contained compensatory 
“workfare” provisions and the evidence of actual hardship is wanting. The frail 
platform provided by the facts of this case cannot support the weight of a positive 
state obligation of citizen support.101 [emphasis added] 
Justice Arbour’s dissent in Gosselin, joined in by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé and referred to 
with respect by the majority, held:  
I would allow this appeal on the basis of the appellant’s s. 7 Charter claim. In doing 
so, I conclude that the s. 7 rights to “life, liberty and security of the person” include a 
positive dimension. …  
This Court has never ruled, nor does the language of the Charter itself require, that 
we must reject any positive claim against the state—as in this case—for the most 
basic positive protection of life and security. This Court has consistently chosen 
instead to leave open the possibility of finding certain positive rights to the basic 
means of subsistence within s.7. In my view, far from resisting this conclusion, the 
language and structure of the Charter—and of s. 7 in particular— actually compel it. 
… .
102
 [emphasis in original] 
 
The majority decision in Gosselin differs from the dissents of Arbour J and L’Heureux-
Dubé J primarily with respect to whether there was sufficient evidence of hardship to support the 
section 7 claim. The majority reasons do not at any point suggest—explicitly or implicitly—that 
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any of the legal propositions in the judgments of Justice Arbour or Justice L'Heureux-Dubé are 
incorrect.103  
Several cases have since held that section 7 does not protect “mere economic rights.” But 
as Justice Arbour concluded in Gosselin, “the rights at issue in this case are so connected to the 
sorts of interests that fall under s. 7 that it is a gross mischaracterization to attach to them the 
label of ‘economic rights’.”104  
The Right to Housing claim similarly asserts that it is “a gross mischaracterization” to 
label a right to live and sleep in a reasonably safe environment a mere “economic right”. Access 
to adequate housing is not a mere “property right”; thus any purported choice by the framers of 
the Charter to exclude “property rights” from section 7 is irrelevant to the claim. It requires a 
deeper analysis of the meaning of the rights to life and security of the person.  
On the second question of “state action,” Arbour J held section 7 can impose positive 
obligations on government to act to protect socio-economic rights: 
 
In my view, the results are unequivocal: every suitable approach to Charter 
interpretation, including textual analysis, purposive analysis, and contextual analysis, 
mandates the conclusion that the s. 7 rights of life, liberty and security of the person 
include a positive dimension.105 
Arbour J held that on the evidence in Gosselin, section 7 was violated.  
Given that the majority in Gosselin does not disavow any of Arbour J’s section 7 
analysis, that leading decision leaves open the extent to which section 7 protects the necessities 
of life, the extent to which governments may have positive obligations under section 7, and 
whether state action is required to trigger a section 7 deprivation. Such fundamental questions 
must be decided on the basis of a sufficient evidentiary record. The housing application is novel 
in focusing squarely on a necessity of life—housing—rather than on means (such as adequate 
social assistance) of obtaining a necessity of life. With 10,000 pages of evidence waiting to be 
heard, the Right to Housing challenge provides an opportunity to squarely determine these key 
legal questions and should not be peremptorily dismissed on a motion to strike.  
Recognizing aspects of adequate housing as protected under section 7 would not 
represent a “massive” change in the meaning of section 7, nor would it represent a substantial 
imposition on elected governments. The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently recognized 
that section 7 grounds a right to at least minimal shelter from the elements.106 The Court held that 
a bylaw preventing homeless people from erecting temporary shelters to protect themselves 
during the night violated section 7 and was not justified under section 1: 
 
[T]he homeless represent some of the most vulnerable and marginalized members of 
our society, and the allegation of the respondents in this case, namely that the Bylaws 
impair their ability to provide themselves with shelter that affords adequate 
protection from the elements, in circumstances where there is no practicable shelter 
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alternative, invokes one of the most basic and fundamental human rights guaranteed 
by our Constitution—the right to life, liberty and security of the person.107 
Moreover, the Right to Housing application does not request that the court order either 
government to implement any particular measures that would provide housing or would entail 
the expenditure of any monies. The most extensive remedy sought is merely an order that the 
governments begin addressing the problem of homelessness by adopting strategies to reduce and 
eliminate homelessness and inadequate housing. It is difficult to imagine a more incremental 
advance towards remedying such a serious Charter violation.  
C. DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS TO LIFE AND SECURITY OF THE 
PERSON 
On a motion to strike, the facts alleged in the pleadings are deemed to be proven. These facts 
include: housing is a necessity of life; homelessness and inadequate housing cause reduced life 
expectancy and cause significant damage to physical, mental, and emotional health; and 
homelessness and inadequate housing can cause death. The application also alleged that “Canada 
and Ontario have instituted changes to legislation, policies, programs and services which have 
resulted in homelessness and inadequate housing. … As a result, they have created and sustained 
conditions which lead to, support and sustain homelessness and inadequate housing.”108 
 The 16 volumes of evidence tendered in support of the application can be found on the 
Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario website. This evidence is much more compelling than any 
summary in a Notice of Application could be. For example, Dr. Stephen Hwang, one of the 
world’s leading experts on the connection between homelessness and health, describes some of 
the research that he and others have done and deposes that there is now “good evidence to 
support a scientific finding that homelessness causes harm to health and increases the risk of 
death.” 109   
Dr. Hwang’s evidence shows that the probability that a 25-year-old man living in 
shelters, rooming houses, or hotels would survive to age 75 is only half that of the general 
population (32 per cent compared to 64 per cent. Amongst women, the study found that 60 per 
cent would survive to 75, compared with 79 per cent in the entire cohort. Compared with the 
entire population, life expectancy was shorter by thirteen years for men and eight years for 
women living in shelters; eleven and nine years, respectively, for those living in rooming houses; 
and eight and five years, respectively, for those living in hotels. Thus Dr. Hwang provides 
irrefutable evidence that homelessness cause a substantial reduction in life expectancy.110 He 
also finds that the same can be said for those who are vulnerably housed.111 
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Professor Paula Goering, a very well respected researcher on homelessness and mental 
health, deposes that homelessness exacerbates mental health issues and addictions.112 Each of the 
four individual applicants’ affidavits describes their own suffering from homelessness or 
inadequate housing.  
D. CANADA’S AND ONTARIO’S ACTIONS AND FAILURES TO ACT 
The Right to Housing application impugns both actions and failures to act by Canada and 
Ontario. When a government institutes changes, it is taking positive action. It is well settled that 
repealing a statute in whole or in part is government action that is properly subject to section 7 
scrutiny.113 Similarly, a Minister’s failure to issue a discretionary permit is an action that can be 
challenged under section 7.114 There is substantial support in the jurisprudence for the 
proposition that government failures to act can breach Charter rights.115 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has concluded that the distinction between legislative 
action and inaction is “very problematic” and provides “no legal basis” for determining whether 
the Charter applies.116 As noted in the unanimous judgment in Vriend, 
 
[t]he relevant subsection, s. 32(1)(b), states that the Charter applies to “the 
legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the 
authority of the legislature of each province.” There is nothing in that wording to 
suggest that a positive act encroaching on rights is required; rather the subsection 
speaks only of matters within the authority of the legislature. Dianne Pothier has 
correctly observed that s. 32 is “worded broadly enough to cover positive obligations 
on a legislature such that the Charter will be engaged even if the legislature refuses 
to exercise its authority” … The application of the Charter is not restricted to 
situations where the government actively encroaches on rights.117 [emphasis in the 
original] 
A full factual record is required to understand the relationships between the various 
governmental actions and failures to act. 
E. VIOLATIONS ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
An infringement of a section 7 right will offend “principles of fundamental justice” if it violates 
“basic tenets of our legal system.” These tenets “may be reflected in the common-law and 
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statutory environment which exists outside of the Charter, they may be reflected in the specific 
and enumerated provisions of the Charter, or they may be more expansive than either of 
these.”118 They include principles recognized both in domestic law and under international 
conventions.119 As stated in Godbout v Longueuil, 
... if deprivations of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person are to survive 
Charter scrutiny, they must be “fundamentally just” not only in terms of the process 
by which they are carried out but also in terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as 
measured against basic tenets of both our judicial system and our legal system more 
generally.120 
The Right to Housing application asserts that the governments’ actions and failures to act 
that caused the deprivations of life and security of the person were arbitrary, disproportionate to 
any governmental interest, and contrary to international human right norms. Such deprivations 
are clearly not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 121 
F. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS SUPPORT ACCESS TO 
ADEQUATE HOUSING 
In dissent in the 1987 Alberta Reference, then Chief Justice Dickson stated that, “the Charter 
should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar 
provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.”122 The majority 
of the Supreme Court has since regularly adopted this statement.123 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that, “In interpreting the scope of application of the Charter, the courts should 
seek to ensure compliance with Canada’s binding obligations under international law where the 
express words are capable of supporting such a construction.”124 
In Victoria v Adams, the trial judge used international law to inform interpretation of the 
Charter’s application to housing rights. On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found, 
 
[t]here is no issue raised on the appeal with respect to the trial judge’s reference to 
international instruments as an aid to interpreting the Charter. Nor could there be. 
The use of international instruments to aid in the interpretation of the meaning and 
scope of rights under that Charter, and in particular the rights protected under s. 7 
and the principles of fundamental justice, is well established in Canadian 
jurisprudence.125 
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As outlined above, numerous international human rights instruments recognize the right 
to housing as a fundamental human right. The evidence on the application addresses the 
significance of those rights both for determining the scope of section 7 and for understanding 
productive solutions to homelessness. The application includes evidence from Miloon Kothari, 
who was the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing from 2000 to 2008. UN 
Special Rapporteurs are independent experts who are appointed by and report to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council. They are mandated to investigate states’ compliance with 
international human rights either within a particular country or in relation to a particular theme, 
investigating, monitoring, and recommending solutions to human rights problems. In his 
affidavit, Mr. Kothari deposes, “My over-arching recommendation is for Canada to adopt a 
comprehensive and coordinated national housing strategy based on the recognition of the right to 
adequate housing, the indivisibility of human rights and the protection of the most vulnerable. 
Canada is one of the few countries in the world without a national housing strategy.”  
G. CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 7 
Given its pre-eminence within the overall scheme of the Charter, “the need to safeguard a degree 
of flexibility in the interpretation and evolution of s. 7” is, as Justice LeBel suggests in Blencoe, 
crucial.126 Also, as Justice L’Heureux-Dubé asserts in G(J), it is necessary to interpret section 7 
through an equality rights lens “to recognize the importance of ensuring that our interpretation of 
the Constitution responds to the realities and needs of all members of society.”127 This is 
especially important if poor people are to benefit equally from the section 7 guarantee. 
As many cases illustrate, the poor have fared poorly in attempts to use the Charter. As 
the Right to Housing claim identifies, people with disabilities, aboriginal people, racialized 
communities, seniors, and youth are all disproportionately affected by homelessness and 
inadequate housing. In this context, “the need to safeguard a degree of flexibility in the 
interpretation and evolution of section 7” and the need to ensure that “our interpretation of the 
Constitution responds to the realities and needs of all members of society” require that the legal 
challenge be allowed to proceed to a hearing on its merits.  
Although this is a novel case, there are no clear rulings that make it certain or even likely 
to fail. International law supports the section 7 claim, as do Canada’s assertions to the UN. The 
leading case, Gosselin, implies that success will turn on whether the evidence makes a 
compelling case that the claimants and others have been deprived of necessities of life. That can 
only be determined at a hearing based on a full factual record.  
V. TAKING SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION SERIOUSLY: 
SECTION 15, HOUSING, AND HOMELESSNESS 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
 
For three decades, Canada’s equality rights jurisprudence has recognized that most 
discrimination arises not as a result of isolated acts motivated by discriminatory intent but 
through the operation and persistence of systems and established practices that disproportionately 
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favour dominant groups while disproportionately marginalizing, disempowering, and 
disadvantaging many groups throughout our communities. In her landmark 1984 Royal 
Commission Report on Equality in Employment, Justice Rosalie Abella called this “systemic 
discrimination.” Examining the policies, procedures, and institutions that shape our daily 
interactions, she stressed that in identifying discrimination, “it is important to look at the results 
of a system” [emphasis added]. Rather than “stamping out brush fires” on a case-by-case basis, it 
is necessary to see “the incendiary potential of the whole forest” and to devise remedies that 
respond to discrimination’s systemic roots.128  
This understanding of discrimination has been developed somewhat further in the 
intervening decades by recognizing that the differential privileges that are enjoyed by groups in 
society are not natural and inevitable. Instead, all discrimination is socially constructed. Systemic 
discrimination arises when systems, practices and institutions of mainstream society reflect and 
reinforce the norms, attributes and privileges of dominant groups.129 As the Supreme Court of 
Canada wrote in Eaton v Brant County Board of Education in the context of disability-based 
discrimination: 
 
Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construction of a society 
based solely on “mainstream” attributes to which disabled persons will never be able 
to gain access. … [I]t is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune 
society so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and 
banishment of disabled persons from participation, which results in discrimination 
against them.130 
 While our equality jurisprudence has long endorsed this understanding of systemic 
discrimination, there have been very few legal claims that have directly impugned a 
discriminatory system. The Right to Housing challenge does this. It is a deliberately and 
consciously systemic challenge. The claim does not examine an individual law or policy in 
isolation. To do so would provide only an incomplete and correspondingly inaccurate picture of 
the social harm. It would pixelate the human experience of disempowerment in a way that 
obscures its true operation and that obscures government accountability for its outcomes. Instead, 
the Right to Housing challenge explicitly names the elements of government action that construct 
and sustain the discriminatory system. It identifies the ways in which these elements operate 
cumulatively as an interconnected system, and it identifies the ways in which they actively and 
predictably drive discriminatory effects and outcomes. The systemic nature of the Right to 
Housing legal claim is both novel and central to its essence. 
  The equality claim in the Right to Housing challenge addresses three themes. It examines 
the principle of substantive equality; the government’s role in creating a new disempowered 
class within society; and the discriminatory impacts that the federal and provincial actions have 
on discrete and identifiable marginalized populations. 
 
B. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
                                                 
128
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Rosalie Silberman Abella, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1984) at 8.  
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The equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter must be interpreted in a “purposive and 
contextual manner in order to permit the realization of the provision’s strong remedial 
purpose.”131 The remedial purposes of section 15 are: (a) “to rectify and prevent discrimination 
against particular groups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in society”; (b) “the 
amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons”; and (c) “the promotion of a society in 
which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally 
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”132 
 The Supreme Court has focused its analysis under section 15 around two inquiries: (1) 
Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground?; and (2) Does the 
distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice and stereotype?133 However, the 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that this framework does not “describe discrete [sic] linear 
steps” and that “it would be inappropriate to attempt to confine analysis under s 15(1) of the 
Charter to a ‘fixed and limited formula.’”134 Rather, these guidelines “should be understood as 
points of reference.”135 
 Since 2011, the Supreme Court has emphasized that ultimately the legal test under 
section 15 is this: “at the end of the day, there is only one question: Does the challenged law 
violate the norm of substantive equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?”136 
 Substantive equality recognizes that section 15 of the Charter is not operating on a blank 
slate. It recognizes that laws operate in a pre-existing legal, political, social, economic, and 
historical context that is marked by inequality and that this inequality is socially constructed as 
opposed to natural or inevitable. For this reason, section 15 has a strong remedial and 
ameliorative purpose.137 Substantive equality is rooted in the recognition that identical treatment 
can produce or exacerbate inequality and that, often, differential treatment that takes into account 
pre-existing differences relative to dominant groups is necessary to secure the remedial purposes 
of section 15.138 
 For this reason, section 15 imposes a duty on government to ensure that the formulation 
of law and policy takes account of potentially differential impacts on different groups in society 
to ensure that government action does not exacerbate pre-existing disadvantage: 
 
Even in imposing generally applicable provisions, the government must take into 
account differences which in fact exist between individuals and so far as possible 
ensure that the provisions adopted will not have a greater impact on certain classes of 
persons due to irrelevant personal characteristics than on the public as a whole. In 
other words, to promote the objective of the more equal society, s. 15(1) acts as a bar 
to the executive enacting provisions without taking into account their possible impact 
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 Lovelace v Ontario, [2000] 1 SCR 950 at para 54, L’Heureux-Dubé J, [Lovelace v Ontario]; Law v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 88, McLachlin J (as she then was) [Law v 
Canada]; M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 at para 47, Cory J, [M v H]. 
132Lovelace v Ontario, supra note 131 at paras 54, 60; Eldridge v British Columbia, supra note 115 at para 54; R v 
Kapp, [2008] 2 SCR 483 at para 15, [R v Kapp ]; Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 
171, [Andrews]; Law v Canada, supra note 131at paras 42–43, 47, 51. 
133R v Kapp, supra note 132 at para 17; and Withler v Canada, [2011] 1 SCR 396 at para 30, [Withler v Canada]. 
134Auton v British Columbia, [2004] 3 SCR 657 at para 24 [Auton]; and Law v Canada, supra note 131 at para 3. 
135Law v Canada, supra note 131 at paras 88, 88(1); M v H, supra note 131 at paras 46–47; Auton supra note 134 at 
para 26. 
136Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 at para 325 (per Abella J) [Quebec v A].  
137Andrews, supra note 132. 
138
 Ibid; Eldridge v British Columbia, supra note 115; and Vriend, supra note 115. 
38
Heffernan et al.: Fighting for the Right to Housing in Canada
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2015
  
  
on already disadvantaged classes of persons.139 
 
To determine if government action or inaction violates the norm of substantive equality, 
“the matter must be considered in the full context of the case, including the law’s real impact on 
the claimants and members of the group to which they belong.”140 “The focus of the inquiry is on 
the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and 
historical factors concerning the group” [emphasis added].141 
 Courts have repeatedly held that where government enters a field it has an obligation to 
ensure that it does so in a non-discriminatory way. As the Supreme Court stated in Eldridge, “in 
many circumstances, this will require governments to take positive action.” The Court in that 
case rejected as a “thin and impoverished vision of section 15(1)” the argument advanced by 
governments “that section 15(1) does not oblige governments to implement programs to alleviate 
disadvantages that exist independently of state action.”142 
As detailed above, the federal and provincial governments have been actively engaged in 
the field of adequate and affordable housing for decades. The Right to Housing challenge argues 
that the range of actions the federal and provincial governments have undertaken to restructure 
governments’ role in housing failed to take into account the needs and circumstances of those 
who are homeless and at risk of homelessness. The governments’ actions make those who are 
already vulnerable, even more vulnerable. The governments’ actions exacerbate their pre-
existing disadvantage. The cumulative effect of the changes to the laws and policies has been to 
drive more people into homelessness and inadequate housing and to sustain conditions that 
perpetuate homelessness, inadequate housing, and the accompanying physical, psychological, 
social, and material harms. 
This brief example illustrates how government actions are interrelated and have a 
cumulative effect: government actions that set social assistance rates significantly below market 
rent, at the same time that government also terminates funding for and construction of affordable 
housing, eliminates rent regulation, and introduces procedures to expedite evictions, predictably 
and inevitably have a differential burden on those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. It 
fails to examine the law’s impact from the perspective of those who are homeless and at risk of 
homelessness and so fails to ensure that the law and policy changes are fine-tuned to address and 
ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged groups. As a result the governments’ actions produce 
more homelessness and more vulnerability. 
As the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “[i]f the state conduct widens the gap 
between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society rather than narrowing it, 
then it is discriminatory.”143 
Whether this differential burden is substantively discriminatory must be considered in a 
full context—on the basis of evidence—taking into consideration factors such as the pre-existing 
disadvantage of the claimant group (those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness), the 
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needs, capacities and circumstances of the claimant group, and in particular the nature of the 
interest that is affected.144 
The Supreme Court of Canada has unanimously ruled that, 
 
[t]he discriminatory calibre of differential treatment cannot be fully appreciated 
without evaluating not only the economic but also the constitutional and societal 
significance attributed to the interests adversely affected by the legislation in 
question. Moreover, it is relevant to consider whether the distinction restricts access 
to a fundamental social institution, or affects ‘a basic aspect of full membership in 
Canadian society,’ or ‘constitute[s] a complete non-recognition of a particular 
group’. 145 [emphasis added]  
Canada’s international law commitments are essential to the understanding of the nature 
of the interests at stake and the significance of the impact on those interests. Canada’s 
international human rights commitments clearly assert that housing is a basic human right. Thus, 
the harm that is imposed or exacerbated by the impugned laws, policies, and activities is of 
profound constitutional significance. 
C. STATE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW DISEMPOWERED GROUP 
From its first section 15 case in Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the 
Charter must be responsive to the multiple inventive and evolving ways in which human beings 
discriminate against each other. While the text of the Charter enumerates specific grounds on 
which discrimination frequently occurs, the text also expressly identifies that this is not a closed 
list. As Justice Wilson wrote in Andrews, the Charter guarantees protection from discrimination 
on the basis of the enumerated grounds, but also on the basis of an open-ended list of grounds 
which are “analogous”: 
I believe also that it is important to note that the range of discrete and insular 
minorities [targeted by discrimination] has changed and will continue to change with 
changing political and social circumstances. … It can be anticipated that the discrete 
and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not recognized as such today. 
It is consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that it be interpreted with 
sufficient flexibility to ensure the ‘unremitting protection’ of equality rights in the 
years to come.146 
 The Right to Housing challenge argues that the impugned government actions have a 
discriminatory impact on groups protected by section 15, identified by the analogous ground of 
homelessness, and by the grounds of sex, disability, race, and reliance on social assistance. 
 The claim asserts that the impugned changes to the laws and policies have an 
unconstitutional effect because they failed to take into account the impact that the changes have 
on: (i) those who are homeless and/or at risk of homelessness; and (ii) those who are affected on 
the basis of sex, race, disability, and receipt of social assistance, thereby exacerbating their pre-
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existing disadvantages, marginalization, exclusion, and deprivation. 
 What is also novel is that the legal argument not only demands recognition of 
“homelessness” as a protected analogous ground, but it also implicates the governments in 
constructing and sustaining a new marginalized group within society—the homeless. Outside of 
section 15, courts have acknowledged the marginalization and vulnerability of the homeless.147 
But whether homelessness constitutes an analogous ground under section 15 remains an issue of 
first impression for the courts.  
 The touchstones to determine if a ground of distinction is “analogous” are “the purpose of 
s. 15(1), the nature and situation of the individual or group at issue, and the social, political, and 
legal history of Canadian society’s treatment of the group.” Analogous grounds “serve to 
advance the fundamental purpose of s. 15(1)” and are based on “characteristics that we cannot 
change or that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting us to change to receive 
equal treatment under the law.” They will often encompass those “lacking in political power”, 
“vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect 
violated,” and “vulnerable to becoming a disadvantaged group.”148 
 The legal claim argues that those who are homeless are among the most marginalized, 
disempowered, precariously situated, and vulnerable in Canadian society. They are subject to 
widespread discriminatory prejudice and stereotype and have been historically disadvantaged in 
Canadian society. Their rights, needs and interests are frequently ignored and overlooked by 
government. Those who are at risk of homelessness are “vulnerable to becoming a disadvantaged 
group.” All of these are factors that have been recognized as contributing to the identification of 
an analogous ground.  
 The fact that those who are homeless are “heterogeneous” in the sense of encompassing 
all races, religions, abilities, sexes, and routes into homeless has no significance. Any group of 
people identified by a single ground—whether an enumerated or an analogous ground—will 
always be heterogeneous as there is never a single characteristic that is definitive of a group. For 
example, women, though protected by the enumerated ground of sex are, at the same time, 
utterly heterogeneous in terms of race, ability, sexual orientation, class, religion, and other 
characteristics. What is relevant under the section 15 analysis is whether the impugned 
government policy affects the group in a way that is meaningfully understood with reference to 
the identified enumerated or analogous ground. The Right to Housing challenge argues that 
examining the impugned law and policy changes with reference to the ground of homelessness 
illuminates impacts that are constitutionally meaningful. 
 As Marie-Eve Sylvestre has written, 
 
it is clear that homeless people in Canada are subject to widespread prejudice, 
stereotype, stigma and discrimination based on their social condition of 
homelessness. False stereotypes and prejudices have informed government policy 
and programs, both federally and provincially in relation to this group.149 
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 Moreover, the governments’ response to homelessness has been increasingly marked by a 
tendency to criminalize the homeless and regulate their use of public space. These government 
responses in turn feed into and fuel stereotypes about and prejudice towards those who are 
homeless.150  
 
D. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DISTINCT MARGINALIZED 
POPULATIONS 
The third part of the equality rights claim details how the impugned laws and policies have 
distinct adverse impacts on groups who are identified by enumerated grounds, that the impacts 
are experienced specifically in relation to those grounds, and that the impugned laws and policies 
as a result violate section 15 on grounds including sex, disability, race, and receipt of social 
assistance.151  
 For example, the impugned laws and policies have a very specific adverse impact on 
women trying to escape domestic violence. As Janet Mosher has written, “Violence against 
women in their intimate relationships is one of the most commonly cited pathways into 
homelessness (whether visible or hidden) for women and children.”152 Because of a lack of 
support for affordable housing, emergency shelter, and transitional housing with supports, 
women are forced to choose between homelessness for themselves and their children or returning 
to, or remaining in, a violent situation.153 Moreover, single mothers often lose custody of their 
children upon becoming homeless, exacerbating the social harms.154 
 As detailed above, the governments’ actions also have very specific discriminatory 
impacts on the basis of disability.155 Existing housing is often inaccessible to persons with 
disabilities and new affordable housing that is accessible is not being built. This has an adverse 
impact on those with physical disabilities because the failure to take the needs, capacities and 
circumstances of this group into account results in individuals and families waiting ten years or 
longer for affordable housing that meets their needs. Deinstitutionalization in the absence of 
supports for community living has resulted in thousands of persons with psycho-social and 
developmental disabilities becoming homeless. UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies have 
expressed concern that Canadian governments’ failure to provide adequate supports for 
community living has resulted in persons with mental disabilities being forced to live in 
detention solely due a lack of supports for living in housing in the community. 
 The Right to Housing challenge also details that Aboriginal people are overrepresented 
among the homeless and inadequately housed population, suffering some of the worst housing 
conditions in the country. Newcomers and racialized persons are also disproportionately 
affected.  
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 Overall, the harms arising from the impugned government actions have created a system 
that fails to take into account and address those who are homeless and most at risk of 
homelessness. As a result, they exacerbate the pre-existing disadvantages of these groups and 
entrench the marginalization of those who are most vulnerable. 
 
VI. REMEDIES 
Just as the legal claim asserts that the harms perpetuated by the impugned government actions 
are systemic, the remedies must equally be systemic. The Right to Housing claim seeks: (a) 
declarations that rights under section 7 and section 15 have been violated; (b) an order to 
implement national and provincial housing strategies; and (c) a supervisory order in respect of 
developing these strategies. Each of these remedies falls entirely within the repertoire of 
remedies that courts can and have fashioned under the Charter.  
 Section 24 of the Charter states that, where Charter rights and freedoms have been 
infringed, the court has the authority to order “such remedy as the court considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances.” What is “appropriate and just in the circumstances” can only be 
decided after a full hearing, on the basis of evidence, which makes findings about “the 
circumstances” which produce the breach and support the efficacy of particular remedies: 
 
Section 24(1) … merely provides that the appellant may obtain such remedy as the 
court considers ‘appropriate and just in the circumstances.’ It is difficult to imagine 
language which could give the court a wider and less fettered discretion. It is 
impossible to reduce this wide discretion to some sort of binding formula for general 
application in all cases, and it is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this 
wide discretion.156 
 
 Courts must take a purposive approach to Charter remedies that provides “a full, 
effective and meaningful remedy for Charter violations,” bearing in mind that “a right, no matter 
how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach.”157 A 
rights violation requires a responsive and effective remedy.158 
 An appropriate and just remedy “is one that meaningfully vindicates the rights and 
freedoms of the claimant,” “take[s] account of the nature of the right that has been violated” and 
is “relevant to the experience of the claimant”: 
 
As such, s.24, because of its broad language and the myriad of roles it may play in 
cases, should be allowed to evolve to meet the challenges and circumstances of those 
cases. That evolution may require novel and creative features when compared to 
traditional and historical remedial practice because tradition and history cannot be 
barriers to what reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies 
demand. In short, the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and 
responsive to the needs of a given case.159 
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 Remedies ordered under section 24 can address the harm a violation causes both to an 
individual and to society because Charter violations impair public confidence and diminish 
“public faith in the efficacy of the constitutional protection.”160 
 Ultimately what the Right to Housing challenge seeks is constructive, coordinated 
government action in compliance with the government’s Charter obligations that supports and 
sustains the most vulnerable group’s rights to life, security of the person, and equality.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Socio-economic rights claims challenge the fundamental tenets of classic liberal constitutional 
theory: they require the judiciary to scrutinize, evaluate, and if necessary order changes so that 
socio-economically marginalized groups have real access to rights and resources. The problem, 
of course, is that these functions have traditionally been seen as the exclusive purview of the 
executive and legislative, not the judicial, branches of government.161 As the former Chief 
Justice of South Africa, Pius Langa notes, this formal interpretation allows “… judges to avoid 
engagement and evade the search for justice.”162 
Unfortunately the motion judge and majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal chose to do 
exactly that in Tanudjaja, raising a fundamental question as to the nature of access to justice in 
Canada and the right of some of the most marginalized communities to have their critical, 
unresolved constitutional claims heard on a full evidentiary record.  
Systemic rights claims grounded in assertions of social and economic rights are 
necessarily complex. That complexity is a reflection of the depth of marginalization and 
oppression experienced by the claimants. Extensive evidence is necessary to bring these 
experiences and impacts to light. Such claims do the hard work of challenging systemic privilege 
and they require that lawyers and judges confront some of the unspoken assumptions of how the 
legal system engages with constitutional rights claims. Charter litigation that proceeds on the 
basis of challenging a single law in isolation is premised on the notion that the baseline 
experience is one of constitutional compliance that delivers security and rights protection. The 
unspoken assumption is that an individual starts with an experience of rights protection and the 
impugned state action is an aberrant divergence from that presumed status of security. As a 
result, the more a claimant has a lived experience of rights protection and security—the closer an 
individual sits to the centre of privilege—the easier it is to see a rights violation as an 
unconstitutional aberration. By contrast, the more bricks there are in the state edifice that 
supports and sustains discrimination and marginalization, the more immune it is to challenge. If 
one challenges a single statute in isolation, even if successful, the edifice does not fall; it simply 
readjusts. Pursuing real rights protection then requires that a detailed evidentiary record reveal 
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and map the components and consequences of an integrated system. This is not an unreasonable 
or impossible task.  
Canadian courts do not always evade the search for justice when there is a collision 
between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government. In Vriend the Supreme 
Court stated, 
… we must remember that the concept of democracy is broader than the notion of 
majority rule, fundamental as that may be … Democratic values and principles under 
the Charter demand that legislators and the executive take these into account; and if 
they fail to do so, courts should stand ready to intervene to protect these democratic 
values as appropriate.163 
 
Mobilization of public support is often necessary for struggles to gain recognition from 
the courts. They must be “… fought for, described as rights, and linked to a more refined and 
legally developed argument about the positive obligations of the state.”164 
The 10,000 pages of evidence which have not yet been allowed before the courts include 
two affiants who found themselves both homeless and battling mental illness. One of them is 
Linda Chamberlain. She lived on and off the streets for close to 35 years. She speaks with a 
compelling voice about the importance of holding the state accountable for ensuring adequate 
housing is truly a right for all and about what the right to housing really means: 
 
When I got my apartment at Mainstay Housing, it felt like I was awake for the first 
time in my life. I was 47 years old. I had a clean home, my own space, and a feeling 
of safety after thirty years of living in shelters, on the street, or in rooming houses. At 
first I thought it was a mistake; that I wasn’t good enough; that it was too good to be 
true. I didn’t unpack for the first year I lived there because I was so afraid that I 
wouldn’t be able to stay.165 
 
We hope that the Right to Housing challenge will provide all those who live in Canada 
with the security and community that Linda Chamberlain finally found. 
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